44 Fla. L. Weekly D1951b
278 So. 3d 212
Appeals — Certiorari — Discovery orders — Insurer failed to demonstrate that trial court departed from essential requirements of law by allowing insured to take deposition of insurer’s representative after insurer had filed a confession of judgment acknowledging that insured was entitled to coverage for personal injury protection benefits and coverage for any property damage claims against him — Confession of judgment did not end case, as issue of damages remained to be adjudicated — Fact that deposition of insurer’s agent could potentially lack relevancy on outstanding damages issue is not basis for certiorari relief
WINDHAVEN INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. PEDRO MARTIN MESQUITA, Respondent. 3rd District. Case No. 3D19-736. L.T. Case No. 19-242. July 31, 2019. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara Areces, Judge. Counsel: Blanca D. Cruz, P.A., and Shelley Ray Senecal, for petitioner. Vargas Gonzalez Hevia Baldwin, LLP, and Matthew L. Baldwin; Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A., and William A. Bonner, for respondent.
(Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES and MILLER, JJ.)
(SCALES, J.) Petitioner Windhaven Insurance Company (“Windhaven”), the defendant automobile insurer in this first-party case, seeks certiorari review of two discovery orders entered by the trial court. We deny the petition because the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law when, under the rather unique circumstances of this case, it compelled the deposition of Windhaven’s representative.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural Background
In July 2017, respondent Pedro Martin Mesquita (“Mesquita”) was involved in an automobile accident. After Windhaven sought to rescind the policy due to an alleged misrepresentation in Mesquita’s insurance application, Mesquita filed a single-count complaint against Windhaven for breach of contract. Mesquita’s original complaint alleged unspecified damages resulting from Windhaven’s “fail[ure] to provide either coverage or payment to [Mesquita] for his losses stemming from the Loss.” Windhaven, under the impression that Mesquita was seeking insurance proceeds only for damage sustained by Mesquita’s own automobile, answered the complaint and asserted as an affirmative defense that the policy contained no collision or comprehensive coverage for Mesquita’s vehicle.
Before Windhaven filed its answer, however, Mesquita filed an amended complaint, again for unspecified damages. Mesquita’s amended complaint alleged that he “suffered personal injuries and other covered losses as a result of a traffic accident.” It appears from the record that, at the time Mesquita filed his amended complaint, Mesquita also had received a property damage subrogation demand from the insurer of the other automobile involved in the accident. Oddly, though, this pending subrogation demand was not referenced in Mesquita’s amended complaint. Rather than answering the amended complaint,1 Windhaven filed a Notice of Confession of Judgment, acknowledging that Mesquita “is entitled to coverage for Personal Injury Protection Benefits as well as coverage for any Properly (sic) damage claims against him pursuant to the policy in question.” Windhaven also conceded Mesquita’s entitlement to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
At the time Windhaven filed its confession of judgment, Mesquita already had filed a motion to compel the deposition of Windhaven’s representative, which was pending. The trial court conducted a hearing on this motion, ultimately granting the motion without limiting the scope of the allowable inquiry to only PIP or property damages. The order, however, did prohibit Mesquita from seeking any financial information regarding Windhaven.2 Shortly thereafter, Windhaven moved for rehearing. The trial court denied Windhaven’s rehearing motion. Windhaven filed the instant petition challenging the two orders and we stayed the proceedings below pending our adjudication of the petition.
II. Analysis
Windhaven argues that, because of Windhaven’s confession of judgment, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by allowing Mesquita to take the deposition of Windhaven’s representative. Windhaven appears to suggest that, by its filing a confession of judgment, the case has ended and discovery — especially discovery as to why Windhaven initially might have denied coverage — is irrelevant.
The problem with Windhaven’s argument is two-fold. First, the case is not over, for the issue of damages remains to be adjudicated. The limited record before us contains no evidence as to the amount of damages to which Mesquita may be entitled under the policy’s PIP provision. Similarly, the limited record before this Court does not quantify either the damages that Windhaven may suffer as a result of the third-party subrogation claim asserted against Mesquita (for which the confession of judgment admits coverage), or the damages, if any, sustained by Mesquita as a result of Windhaven’s initial denial of coverage. Hence, Windhaven’s confession of judgment did not “end” the case.
Second, while we acknowledge Windhaven’s argument that a deposition of its agent might not shed light on these outstanding damages issues, an order allowing discovery that potentially could lack relevancy is not subject to certiorari relief. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995)(“[W]e do not believe that discovery of irrelevant materials necessarily causes irreparable harm.”).3 We do not view the trial court’s order as affording Mesquita “carte blanche” to irrelevant discovery. Id.; Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Santos, 118 So. 3d 317, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Therefore, under our standard of certiorari review, we cannot say that the “discovery order departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury.” Kobi Karp Architecture & Interior Design, Inc. v. Charms 63 Nobe, LLC, 166 So. 3d 916, 919 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
Petition denied.
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1The parties dispute whether Windhaven’s answer, filed two days after Mesquita filed his amended complaint, answered Mesquita’s original complaint or his amended complaint. Our decision to deny Windhaven’s petition is not dependent on a resolution of this procedural dispute, so we do not address it further.
2The transcript from the hearing reveals some confusion by the parties’ counsel as to whether punitive damages are available in this case. As reflected in the trial court’s limitation of the discovery, though, the trial court correctly noted that no claim for punitive damages had been sought, and her ruling on Mesquita’s discovery motion did not preview any future ruling on any yet-to-be-asserted punitive damages claim.
3If the deposition yields no admissible evidence, the trial court, despite Windhaven’s confession of judgment, certainly may exercise its discretion to disallow Mesquita’s recovery of attorney’s fees associated with the deposition.