PIP Portal

17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 887a

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 1710ALFO

NOT FINAL VERSION OF OPINION
Subsequent Changes at 19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 6dInsurance — Personal injury protection — Interest — Attorney’s fees — Where it was undisputed that insurer paid providers all benefits prior to demand letter filed by insured’s counsel and prior to filing of lawsuit, but insurer miscalculated interest due with respect to two of the six providers whose bills were paid; record reflects that at no time did plaintiff, through counsel, advise insurer of the amount of interest owing and, in fact, waited fourteen months before filing defective demand letter; and, although complaint alleged that action was for damages in excess of $100.01, the amount of interest miscalculation was actually less than $3, doctrine of “de minimis non curat lex” precludes any lawsuit — Trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff and in awarding attorney’s fees and costs to plaintiff

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. MARTA S. ALFONSO, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case Nos. 08-120 AP, 08-344 AP (Consolidated). L.C. Case No. 06-03890 SP-26. July 1, 2010. An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida. Robin Faber, Judge. Counsel: Lara J. Edelstein, United Automobile Insurance Company, Office of General Counsel/Trial Division, Miami, for Appellant. Stuart B. Yanofsky, Plantation, for Appellee.

(Before Hubbart, Bailey, Leban, JJ.)

INTRODUCTION

(LEBAN, MARK KING, JUDGE.) This appeal raises the specter of the maxim “de minimis non curat lex,” which translates to “the law does not concern itself with trifles.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). It also, unfortunately, presents a classic example of a lawsuit brought painfully for no other justification than the award of attorney’s fees. As will be seen, this Court will not countenance either result.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 12, 2004, Plaintiff/Appellee, hereinafter Plaintiff, was involved in an automobile accident in which she sustained injuries. At the time, Plaintiff had a valid policy of insurance with Appellant/Defendant, United Automobile Insurance Company, hereinafter UNITED, which provided coverage for Personal Injury Protection (PIP). It is undisputed that Plaintiff received treatment from six separate medical providers, all six of which were paid in full as to principal by UNITED, as demonstrated by the cashing of UNITED’S checks on January 18 and 26, 2005. (R. 131-135). The dispute, such as it is, arises from UNITED’S admitted error in calculating the interest due with respect to two of these providers, South Miami Hospital and South Miami Criticare, Inc. In any event, there is no dispute that UNITED paid the amount of the benefits to all providers prior to the March 8, 2006, demand letter filed by Plaintiff’s counsel, and prior to the filing of the lawsuit on July 25, 2006. (See R. 24-30).

While the demand letter was, as stated, submitted on March 8, 2006, the record reflects that the checks to the two providers at issue were cashed on January 18 and 26, 2005, some fourteen (14) months prior to the demand letter, and approximately seventeen (17) months prior the lawsuit being filed on July 25, 2006.

The record reflects that at no time did the Plaintiff, through counsel, advise UNITED of the amount of the miscalculation of the interest owing.¹ The demand letter itself set forth only the principal amounts due the six providers. At no time, prior to the filing of the lawsuit on July 25, 2006, did the Plaintiff, nor counsel, provide UNITED with the precise amount of the interest underpayment.

Instead, on July 25, 2006, as stated, Plaintiff filed her complaint which, in paragraph 1, alleges as follows:

This is an action for damages for overdue no-fault benefits, interest on overdue no-fault benefits, and interest on late payment of no-fault benefits, that exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.01) but do not exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00). [Emphasis added].

On December 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed her MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, in which it is alleged in pertinent part, as follows:

Defendant did not tender payment on said bills within 30 days of receipt of same. Instead, Defendant issued its check to South Miami Hospital for $104.32 on or about 12/29/04, despite having received the bill on 6/8/04. Note on 12/29/04 Defendant also made an interest payment related to this bill in the amount of $3.16. As such, Defendant owed interest on this payment “calculated from the date the insurer was furnished with written notice of the amount of covered loss.” Fla.Stat. 627.736 (4)(c). Thus, Defendant owed 204 days worth of interest, which calculated at the 2004 interest rate of 7% amounts to a total interest due and payable in the amount of $4.08 which is $0.92 more than the amount actually paid by Defendant.

Similarly, Defendant first issued a check in the amount of $178.40 to South Miami Criticare, plus interest totaling $1.06 on or about 12/29/04. This was, in this case, 78 days from the date the bills were received and thus Defendant owed interest in the amount of $2.67 which is $1.61 more than the amount paid by the Defendant. Thus, Defendant continues to owe the balance in interest payment on this bill. [Second and third emphasis added].

Thus, while the complaint alleges that this is a lawsuit for in excess of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00), the Summary Judgment Motion seeks payment in the grand total of $2.53, which is the amount of the interest miscalculation made by UNITED.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING

The summary judgment motion filed December 18, 2007, came on for hearing before the trial court on February 22, 2008, nearly two years after the March 8, 2006, demand letter. The motion was directed solely to the underpayment of interest concerning only the bills from South Miami Hospital and South Miami Criticare. The motion admitted that UNITED, prior to the lawsuit, made full payment of the principal amount of benefits to the two providers at issue, but sought $0.92 representing the interest shortage due to South Miami Hospital and $1.61 in outstanding interest due to South Miami Criticare. In addition, the motion sought an award of attorney’s fees and costs. In opposition to the motion, UNITED filed inter alia the checks issued and cashed on behalf of the providers. Counsel for the Plaintiff set forth the shortage and argued that “the interest was incorrectly calculated.” S.R. 45. Counsel for UNITED argued that the demand letter merely listed the bills at issue and asserted that the “statute² states that the demand letter needs to state with specificity what it’s [sic] owed. Counsel had the opportunity when they received our payment for the hospital bill and for the Critic Care [sic] bill to send a new demand letter stating, your interest is off and you still owe $2.” S.R. 49. UNITED further argued that if payment is made in an incorrect amount, “they then should propound a second demand letter to the Defendant stating, you still owe us $2.15 or $0.92 or whatever we’re here about.” S.R. 49-50. UNITED also asserted as follows:

Your Honor, this is about attorneys fees. Why in the world would my client pay all of these bills listed on the demand letter and let them sue us for $2.00? Your Honor, this is . . . ridiculous, ***After you get the check, you cash the check, and then you file suit for $2.00. This is ridiculous. Id. at 50.

***

I would submit to the Court that this is about attorneys fees. . . . S.R. 51.

The court asked to see the demand letter and commented, in response to UNITED’S argument that the Plaintiff simply should have sent a second demand letter, that the interest shortage was “kind of a floating figure” depending on what day the insurer sends out payment. Finally, rejecting UNITED’S arguments that the demand letter was deficient or that a corrected demand letter could have been sent out, the court concluded as follows:

THE COURT: Okay. Whatever it is, it’s a minimal amount, I think we can all agree on that. But that’s what the statute requires has to have been paid and I can’t help that, you know. I think I have to grant her motion. S.R. 62.

Final Judgment was thus entered in the amount of $2.53, and, subsequently, an order for attorney’s fees and costs by settlement of the parties was entered in the amount of $13,370.25, plus interest. R. 224-25. These consolidated appeals followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So.2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). A trial court should grant a motion for summary judgment only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 1.510(c), Fla.R.Civ.P.; Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 1977). Moreover, this burden to conclusively prove the nonexistence of a material fact is on the moving party. See, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966); Williams v. Garden City Claims, Inc., 796 So.2d 586, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Only after this burden has been met does the burden shift to the nonmoving party. See Holl, 191 So.2d at 44. However, the “issue” must be one of material fact, and issues of nonmaterial facts are irrelevant to the summary judgment determination. See Rule 1.510(c), Fla.R.Civ.P.; Hancock v. Dept. of Correction, 585 So.2d 1068, 1070-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev. denied, 598 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1992). Moreover, “[f]or purposes of summary judgment, a court is to treat the allegations of the complaint as true.” University Nursing Care Center, Inc. v. First Union National Bank, 835 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Where the allegations of the complaint and the documents offered in opposition to the summary judgment motion create a material question of fact, it is error to grant summary judgment. Napoli v. Buchbinder, 685 So.2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). A complaint “may serve the same purpose as an affidavit supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment.” Boettcher v. IMC Mortg. Co., 871 So.2d 1047, 1048 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW³

Perhaps the most facile way to resolve the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment is to apply the rule that where the allegations of the complaint, here, that “[t]his is an action for damages for overdue. . . interest . . . that exceed One Hundred Dollars. . . but do not exceed Five Hundred Dollars,” and the documents offered in support or in opposition to the summary judgment motion create a material question of fact, it is error to grant summary judgment. Napoli v. Buchbinder, 685 So.2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Since the complaint serves the same purpose as an affidavit supporting a motion for summary judgment, Boettcher v. IMC Mortg. Co., 871 So.2d 1047, 1048, n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and the very documents submitted by the Plaintiff, both attached to the complaint and in support of its summary judgment motion, demonstrate that the total amount owed by UNITED nowhere exceeds One Hundred Dollars, a “material question of fact” exists as a matter of law and for that reason alone, it was reversible error to grant summary judgment. A “genuine issue as to any material fact,” Rule 1.510 (c), Fla.R.Civ.P., is created by simple comparison of the complaint with the supporting documents demonstrating a $2.53 interest under payment.

The more substantive basis for reversal of the summary judgment in the case at bar arises from the insufficiency of the demand letter itself to provide the insurer an opportunity to know the exact amount of the purportedly overdue claim. Section 627.736 (11), Fla. Stat. (2003), the demand letter provision here at issue, promotes the legislative goal of reducing unnecessary litigation so as to avoid precisely what occurred in the case at bar, actions that could have easily been resolved before suit. Here, UNITED expressly argued that the demand letter sent by the Plaintiff failed to contain the exact amount of the overdue claim and, thus, the Plaintiff never put UNITED on notice that the providers were owed an additional $2.53 in interest payments. See Fountain Imaging of West Palm Beach, LLC (a/a/o Charlotte Jennings), v. Progressive Express Insurance Company, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 614 (a) (Fla. 15th Jud. Cir. March 30, 2007) (“demand letter failed to comply with Fla.Stat. §627.736 (11) because it failed to state the ‘exact amount’ owed. *** [Provider] should have claimed what it was owed or, at a bare minimum, provided Progressive with the information it needed to compute the amount owed. . .”.).

The trial judge in the case at bar inquired if “there [is] any case that says that when an insurance company pays an amount to a Plaintiff, pursuant to the demand letter, and there’s a disagreement over the amount that was paid, is there a requirement that a second demand letter be sent or something says, hey, you are wrong. You didn’t do it right. Or can they just file suit?” S.R. 58. Indeed, cases abound demonstrating “a second demand letter” where a discrepancy exits which can “adequately correct[ ] the initial error. . .”. United Automobile Insurance Company v. Professional Medical Group, Inc., a/a/o Gaston M. Botta, 26 So.3d 21, 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). In Professional Medical Group, Inc., the Third District construed section 627.736 (5)(d), Fla. Stat., which sets forth the requirements for providing notice of a loss, comparable to the demand letter provision here at issue, and observed that “nothing in the statute’s plain language indicates that the absence of the license number cannot be cured by later submission of the number. . . on another claim form. . . . It is undisputed that PMG provided United the license number on another claim form that was mailed to United with a demand letter prior to litigation. Accordingly, any error or omission, if it existed, was sufficiently cured by PMG prior to the initiation of litigation.” Id. at 24. [Emphasis added]. The Court also interpreted section 627.732(13), Fla. Stat., defining “properly completed” as follows:

“Properly completed” means providing truthful, substantially complete, and substantially accurate responses as to all material elements to each applicable request for information or statement by a means that may lawfully be provided and that complies with this section, or as agreed by the parties. Id. [Third District’s emphasis].

The Third District concluded that there is “nothing in the language of this statute [section 627.736 (5)(e) 5]. . . that a failure [in submitting] . . . the initial, timely set of bills cannot be cured.” Id. at 24 [emphasis added]. See also McCormack v. Flens, 27 So.3d 179, 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (acknowledging the propriety of sending a second demand letter, which adjusted the amount claimed to be due based on a subsequent accounting).

In the case at bar, had the Plaintiff, upon receipt and cashing of the purportedly miscalculated $2.53 interest payment, simply sent out a second demand letter, putting UNITED on notice of the deficiency, one never sought by the providers, no lawsuit would have been filed, nor any judgment entered for such as paltry amount, nor any award for attorney’s fees for such a conscience-of-the-court shockingly large amount. “No court is obliged to approve a judgment which so obviously offends even the most hardened appellate conscience and which is so obviously contrary to the manifest justice of the case. Indeed, it is obliged not to. . .”. Miller v. First American Bank & Trust, 607 So.2d 483, 484-5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). It is for this additional reason that we reverse the entry of final summary judgment entered below.

Reversal is also compelled by the long-standing doctrine mentioned in the very first sentence of this opinion, de minimus non curat lex, which the Florida Supreme Court, more than a century ago, recognized and applied in the strikingly similar case of Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla. 161, 169-70 (1858):

[W]ere the error of such an amount as to demand consideration, we might be inclined to give the Defendant a new trial, for the purpose of having it corrected. But the amount of the excess is so trifling, that acting upon the maxim of “de minimis non curat lex,” we are indisposed by remanding the cause, to subject the parties to additional costs, which would probably amount to more than the actual excess of the verdict. The evidence shows that a demand for the payment of the account was made some time in the year 1856, but the precise date is not stated. The suit was instituted on the 21st day of April, 1857. The error in the verdict therefore is, that the interest was calculated from the 1st day of January, 1956 when ***, it ought to have been calculated only from the date of the commencement of the suit, or at farthest, only from the 31st day of December, 1956. The excess in the one case amounts to about nine dollars and in the other to about eleven dollars — a sum too small, considering the amount of the principal demand, to subject the parties to further litigation. [Emphasis added].

We find the Milton case, and its progeny, to be controlling in the case at bar. There, as here, the defendant miscalculated the interest due in an amount “so trifling”⁴ as to preclude the very litigation at issue.

Although in a slightly different context, the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit addressed a miscalculation of an interest penalty in a trifling amount, there, eighty-nine cents, and held that summary judgment in favor of a provider in a PIP case was reversible error, rejecting the provider’s argument that a penalty is payable on the accrued interest which, the court found, would result “in what is tantamount to assessing a penalty upon a penalty, an unreasonable result when the insurer paid late but without the necessity of filing a lawsuit.” Peachtree Casualty Insurance Company v. Spine & Rehab. Medicine, P.A., 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 622a (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. May 1, 2009). [Emphasis added]. In Peachtree, the provider argued that pursuant to the demand statute, the penalty of 10 percent must be calculated on the principal sum of the claim plus interest; the insurer, in contrast, argued that “interest does not comprise part of an overdue payment; therefore, a penalty does not accrue as to interest. Stated another way, interest is due only when payment is made.” The insurer “paid both the interest and the penalty on the overdue benefits. It properly did not pay a penalty on the interest.” [Original emphasis]. The Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the provider and directed the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Peachtree. In addition, the court denied the insured’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees “inasmuch as it is not the prevailing party.”

The significance of Peachtree lies not only in its majority holding, but in the dissenting opinion of Judge Barton who, citing Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla. 161, 169-70 (Fla. 1858), stated that he “would go a step further than the majority and dismiss this case based on the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex.” We fully agree with Judge Barton’s analysis and adopt it as our own:

Appellee filed this lawsuit to recover an alleged unpaid penalty payment in the amount of $0.89. The attorneys for the parties and the trial court have expended considerable energy in resolving the procedural and substantive issues raised by the pleadings. Now, the appellate court has devoted comparable effort in reviewing the briefs and records on appeal.

In my view, the time has come to say, “Enough!” The ancient legal maxim “de minimis non curat lex” (literally, “the law does not care about small things”) has been used, mainly in equitable actions involving real property, to distinguish between substantial and trivial matters. [Citation omitted].

As long ago as 1858, the Florida Supreme Court refused to remand a cause to the trial court for further proceedings, when considering an excessive award of interest totaling between $9.00 and $11.00, a sum too small, according to the Court to subject the parties to further litigation. Milton v. Blackshear, 8 Fla. 161, 169-170 (Fla. 1858). See also Florida Nat’l Bank v. Bisson, 240 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (Judgment affirmed in part, based on de minimis non curate lex).

In more recent times, the legal doctrine discussed above has been applied to justify the denial of an otherwise mandatory award of appellate attorney’s fees. Sanchez v. State Farm Ins. Co., 997 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). [Emphasis added].

In Sanchez, supra, cited in Judge Barton’s Peachtree dissent, the Third District denied a motion for statutory attorney’s fees, notwithstanding the fact that the appellant there voluntarily dismissed its appeal, refusing to remand for what the Court considered “additional judicial labor incurred, for activity best characterized as ‘de minimis.’” 997 So.2d at 1209.

The doctrine has been followed at all levels of Florida Courts since its 1858 premiere. Thus, in Korash v. Mills, 263 So.2d 579, 582 (Fla. 1972), the Florida Supreme Court, addressing a “miscalculation” made by an assessor, found it to be “obviously a mistake, error, oversight, which cannot be prejudicial to the taxpayer,” and further observed that “[j]ustice may be ‘blind’ but it is not stupid. Impartial fairness and equality is what the blindford [sic] represents.” Id. at 582 [emphasis added]. The Korash Court concluded that “[i]nstances such as the error in the present case . . . are rare; they are more nearly cases of [d]e minimis non curat lex.” Id. The doctrine has, perhaps, special application in PIP litigation. Whatever its upper limit, which we need not here decide, it certainly applies to interest miscalculations in the range of Milton’s $9.00 to $11.00, and Peachtree’s miscalculation of $0.89. The case at bar, as is now clear, involves $2.53. One wonders how “de minimis” an amount for which an insured/provider will repair to the court for redress: $1.23? $0.25? A nickel?THE $13,370.25

AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES

We turn now to what UNITED asserted below is “the real issue” in the case at bar, namely, the award of attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party” pursuant to section 627.428, Florida Statutes (2003). As recognized in cases such as Federated National Company v. Esposito, 937 So.2d 199, 200-201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), where the particular issue was whether an appraisal award should be confirmed after it had been paid, “[t]he underlying question driving this case is whether an insurer is subject to attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 627.428, Florida Statutes (2005). . .”. As already observed, the Third District refused to award appellate attorney’s fees notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of the appeal where “de minimis” activity was involved. Sanchez v. State Farm Insurance Company, 997 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). At the trial court level, prevailing party attorney’s fees have also been denied where the insurer’s actions “do[ ] not rise to the level of wrongful conduct necessary to impose a fee award against the insurer.” Liberty National Life Insurance Company v. Bailey, 944 So.2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The rationale of such cases is that section 627.428, Florida Statutes, is to be strictly construed since it is in derogation of the common law and an award of attorney’s fees is deemed a penalty to discourage wrongful refusals to pay policy benefits. Id.

We adopt the rationale set forth in Judge Altenbernd’s concurring opinion in Stewart v. Midland Life Insurance Co., 899 So.2d 331, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), wherein he stated:

[I]n reality, this lawsuit has been exclusively a claim for attorneys’ fees without any underlying legal theory upon which [plaintiff] can prevail. *** The purpose of section 627.428 is “to discourage the contesting of valid claims against insurance companies and to reimburse successful insureds for their attorney’s fees when they were compelled to defend or sue to enforce their insurance contracts” [Citation omitted]. Attorneys’ fees should not be awarded where there is no valid dispute and where the insurer is not contesting or has not denied coverage.

Accord, Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Battaglia, 503 So.2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (reversing award of $12,000.00 attorney’s fees where there was no evidence that “GEICO. . . ever wrongfully denied uninsured motorist coverage in this case.”); State Farm Florida Insurance Company v. Lorenzo, 969 So.2d 393, 397 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (where the insureds were not forced to sue to receive benefits[,] applying the [attorney’s fee statute] would encourage unnecessary litigation by rewarding a race to the courthouse for attorney’s fees even where the insurer was complying with its obligations under the policy.”).

In the case at bar, there was no wrongful conduct by UNITED. Although its payment of principal was not made within 30 days, resulting in the accrual of interest, payments were made fourteen months prior to what this Court has found to be a defective demand letter, there was no reason why Plaintiff could not have cured the demand letter,⁵ the providers cashed the checks issued and never sought the $2.53 miscalculated interest, and Plaintiff waited some 18 months before filing suit. As held in Tristar Lodging, Inc., v. Arch Specialty Insurance Co., 434 F.Supp. 2d 1286, 1297-8 (M.D. Fla. 2006):

[T]here is a fundamental due process concern in finding that an insurance company which appropriately pays a valid claim according to the policy terms must still pay attorney’s fees, because a claimant sued it to do what it was already in the process of doing*** [T]his statute. . . has consistently been interpreted to authorize recovery of attorney’s fees from an insurer only when the insurer has wrongfully withheld payment of the proceeds of the policy. [Emphasis added].

Here too, especially where the insurance company did not contest liability, paid the providers the principal balance due them, and did nothing to force this patently vexatious fee-driven lawsuit, it would unduly penalize the insurer, and worse, improperly reward Plaintiff’s counsel to uphold any fee award under section 627.428. Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees, and further deny any appellate attorney’s fees.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that summary judgment was erroneously entered against UNITED inasmuch as the complaint and supporting documents create a genuine issue of material fact, the demand letter was defective, and the doctrine of “de minimis non curat lex” precludes any lawsuit on the facts of this case. We further hold that the award of attorneys fees must be reversed since Plaintiff is not the prevailing party. Marty v. Bainter, 727 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Finally, the motion for appellate attorney’s fees is DENIED.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions that the complaint be dismissed. (Bailey, J; Hubbart, J., concur).

__________________

¹While not germaine to the resolution of this appeal, it is noteworthy that, as argued below by UNITED’S counsel, at no time did either provider seek payment of the deficient amount. (See S.R. 51).

²Section 627.736(11), Florida Statutes (2003).

³It should be noted that in this appeal, no timely brief was filed by Appellee, and on December 5, 2008, on motion of UNITED, this Court entered its order precluding Plaintiff from filing an Answer Brief or participating in oral argument. The Court will not speculate on why Appellee did not deem this case worthy of briefing.

⁴One can only surmise that in 1858, the $20.00 there at issue was worth far more than the $2.53 at issue in the case at bar.

⁵As for the trial court’s observation in the case at bar that the precise calculation of interest is “kind of a floating figure,” (S.R. 60), as its rationale for rejecting UNITED’S argument that a second demand letter could have cured the miscalculated interest, that is precisely why a curative demand letter would be appropriate in cases where, as here, the principal amount has been paid in full and cashed some 14 months before even the first demand letter, and some 18 months before suit is filed.