GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant, v. ALL X-RAY DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES, INC., a/a/o ROBERTO ALVAREZ, Appellee.

26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 341b

Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2605ALVAInsurance — Personal injury protection — Coverage — Owner of vehicle for which security was required by law — Trial court erred in ruling that vehicle with salvage rebuildable title was not motor vehicle under Florida law and was, therefore, not required to be insured — Question of whether insurance is required is dependent on whether vehicle is operated or driven on roads of state, not how vehicle is titled — Remand for factual determination of whether vehicle was operated or driven on roads of state

GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant, v. ALL X-RAY DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES, INC., a/a/o ROBERTO ALVAREZ, Appellee. Circuit Court, 11th Judicial Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County. Case No. 2016-106-AP-01. L.T. Case No. 08-3316-SP-25. July 3, 2018. On appeal by Geico Indemnity Company (“Geico”) from a “Final Judgment in Favor of the Plaintiff,” entered on February 11, 2016, which granted summary judgment in favor of All X-Ray Diagnostic Services, Inc. (“X-Ray”). Counsel: Scott W. Dutton, Dutton Law Group, P.A., for Appellant. Marlene S. Reiss, Law Offices of Marlene S. Reiss, Esq., P.A., for Appellee.

(Before HOGAN SCOLA, BUTCHKO, and VERDE, JJ.)

(BUTCHKO, J.) On June 22, 2007, the Claimant, Roberto Alvarez (“Alvarez”) was injured in an automobile accident while driving a 2004 Infinity G35 (the “Infinity”) owned by his girlfriend, Anisleidys Zamora Noguera (“Noguera”), with whom he resided at the time. At all relevant times, the Infinity was insured by Noguera with Geico. On the date of the accident, Alvarez owned a 2001 Mercury Sable Sedan (the “Mercury”), which at the time of the accident was titled under a salvage/rebuildable title.

A person injured in an accident while in another’s vehicle may not recover PIP benefits from the insurer of that vehicle, if that person also owns a vehicle which is required to be insured. See Epperson v. Dixie Insurance Co., 461 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see also Section 627.736(4)(e)4.a., Fla. Stat. (2007). The trial court relied upon how the vehicle was titled in determining whether it was required to be insured. As a result, the trial court held that the Mercury having a salvage rebuildable title is not considered a motor vehicle under Florida law. Accordingly, the trial court found that the Mercury was not required to be insured and held that coverage for Claimant Alvarez was therefore mandated through Geico’s Policy.

This Appellate Court finds that the underlying issue regarding whether insurance is required is not based on how a vehicle is titled, but rather, whether it is operated or driven on the roads of the State of Florida. See § 320.02, Fla. Stat. (2007) (requiring every owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle which is operated or driven on the roads of this state to register the vehicle); see also § 627.733, Fla. Stat. (2007) (requiring security [PIP] for every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered and licensed in this state).

Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the Mercury was being operated or driven on the roads of the State of Florida. If the Mercury was being operated on the roads of the State of Florida, it was required to be insured. Therefore, Mr. Alvarez would be deemed to be self-insured and personally liable for PIP benefits. If it was not being driven or operated on the roads of the State of Florida, the Mercury was not required to be insured and Mr. Alvarez would be covered under Ms. Noguera’s Geico PIP Policy.

Accordingly, the “Final Judgment in Favor of the Plaintiff,” granting summary judgment in favor “X-Ray” is hereby REVERSED and REMANDED. The trial court is instructed to submit the issue of whether the Mercury was being operated or driven on the roads of the State of Florida to a jury for a factual determination, and then rule in accordance with the above opinion. The trial court is further instructed to address all motions for fees and costs accordingly. (HOGAN SCOLA and VERDE, JJ., concur)